Variability of valuation of non-monetary incentives motivating and implementing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism by Ellis, Jason Blake
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2009-03
Variability of valuation of non-monetary incentives
motivating and implementing the Combinatorial
Retention Auction Mechanism
Ellis, Jason Blake













Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
VARIABILITY OF VALUATION OF NON-MONETARY 
INCENTIVES: MOTIVATING AND IMPLEMENTING THE 








 Thesis Co-Advisors:   William Gates 
  Peter Coughlan 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
March 2009 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  Variability of Valuation of Non-Monetary Incentives:  
Motivating and Implementing the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Jason B. Ellis 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
This thesis explores the concept of preference variability relative to non-monetary and monetary incentives 
in the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  CRAM offers a mix of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives to encourage retention behavior.  Recent research demonstrated the utility of non-monetary incentives as 
part of a military retention program.  While CRAM was shown to cost effectively motivate retention, variability in 
valuation of non-monetary incentives as part of CRAM introduces complexity in eliciting preferences to implement 
the model.  Making certain complexity decreasing assumptions regarding the personal valuation of incentives 
potentially affects the model cost and retention outcomes.  These assumptions could potentially increase costs and 
retain the “wrong” sailors.  
This thesis examines an operational version of the CRAM, which assumes additive personal preferences 
across combinations of nonmonetary incentives to decrease complexity of the model.  The outcomes of this 
“simplified” model are compared to the “more complex” previous research findings.  The simplified CRAM model 
continues to produce cost saving, with no significant changes to the mix of personnel retained.  Overall, results of the 
CRAM assuming additive personal preferences across combinations of nonmonetary incentives are not significantly 




15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
81 
14. SUBJECT TERMS: Military Retention Auction Manpower Variability Compensation Preference 
Elicitation Non-monetary Incentives 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
VARIABILITY OF VALUATION OF NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES: 




Jason B. Ellis 
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
B.S., University of Nebraska Medical Center-Lincoln, 1997 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 

























William R. Gates 
Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the concept of preference variability relative to non-monetary 
and monetary incentives in the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  
CRAM offers a mix of monetary and non-monetary incentives to encourage retention 
behavior.  Recent research demonstrated the utility of non-monetary incentives as part of 
a military retention program.  While CRAM was shown to cost effectively motivate 
retention, variability in valuation of non-monetary incentives as part of CRAM introduces 
complexity in eliciting preferences to implement the model.  Making certain complexity 
decreasing assumptions regarding the personal valuation of incentives potentially affects 
the model cost and retention outcomes.  These assumptions could potentially increase 
costs and retain the “wrong” sailors.  
This thesis examines an operational version of the CRAM, which assumes 
additive personal preferences across combinations of nonmonetary incentives to decrease 
complexity of the model.  The outcomes of this “simplified” model are compared to the 
“more complex” previous research findings.  The simplified CRAM model continues to 
produce cost saving, with no significant changes to the mix of personnel retained.  
Overall, results of the CRAM assuming additive personal preferences across 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES 
This research expands an ongoing investigation of how sailors value non-
monetary incentives as part of a retention package, and how variability in the value 
sailors place on individual and combinations of incentives could affect cost and retention 
outcomes in a Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism.  It examines the magnitude 
of variation present when CRAM models different variables, if adjustments are required, 
and what is the best method to accomplish the adjustments.   
The ability of the United States military to carry out a multitude of assigned 
missions depends upon many factors.  While technology, mobility, and a strong 
infrastructure serve to support military operations worldwide, arguably the most 
significant factor affecting success is the individual soldier, airman, sailor or marine.  
While the specific service requirements related to personnel change over time, the 
underlying requirement for a highly motivated, fully trained, and well equipped force to 
meet U. S. policy and strategy objectives may not.  Personnel policies that enable the 
military to recruit, train, and retain service members with the required skills to meet the 
military’s many missions will always be at the forefront of various U.S. military 
personnel management systems.   
Given the current worldwide political situation and the United States involvement 
in wide spread campaigns around the globe, the need for experienced personnel that 
possess the skills required by the military has never been greater.  Undoubtedly, today’s 
military has a focus toward retention and needs to predict the incentives necessary to 
accomplish these crucial missions. 
The Department of Defense is a significant sponsor of the current body of 





alternatives to traditional bonus monetary incentives that might elicit positive retention 
behavior among service members.  This research focuses on cost effective 
implementation measures. 
Recent research has evaluated whether alternatives to monetary-only incentives 
might provide a viable and cost effective alternative to improve retention efforts in the 
Navy.  Research conducted by LT Brooke Zimmerman found that among monetary-only, 
Universal incentives (a set of benefits available to all personnel and that does not 
change), and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Method (CRAM) in which sailors 
choose the incentives they would like to have in combination with a cash bonus, that 
CRAM offers the opportunity for the Navy to enjoy required retention rates at overall 
lower costs, while allowing sailors to individualize their compensation packages and 
receive the benefits that are of greatest value to them1.  The results are based upon 
assumptions given in her research, and should only be generalized to the specific 
population she evaluated, but are intriguing.   
While she did not specifically address the concept of individual choice and 
empowerment among sailors, certainly it could be expected that freedom to choose 
retention incentives improves not only retention, but also satisfaction among those 
retained.  The results of this research have compelled further investigation of whether 
there are opportunities to design and implement retention plans that can efficiently and 
effectively retain the required sailors to meet the Navy’s goals, using CRAM.   
There are many reasons to consider alternatives to the traditional selective 
reenlistment bonus.  Currently though, the increasing cost of administering the program 
could be considered a driving factor.  The United States General Accounting Office 
reported in 1997 that the Selective Reenlistment Bonus burden for the entire Department 
of Defense was $235 million.  During this same period, the individual service member 
                                                 
1 Brooke Zimmerman, “Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives Utilizing the 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM),” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
2008). 
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could receive a bonus of up to $60,000, although this offering would be rare.2  In 2007, 
the Navy alone eclipsed the $235 million mark set DoD-wide just 10 years earlier, 
spending over $359 million.3  Obviously the Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) 
System is becoming increasingly costly to execute.  The increase in SRB spending should 
lead us to question the potential diminishing returns for the SRB dollar spent.   
To address this concern there is a need to consider new methods and structures for 
retention incentives.  Non-monetary incentives could potentially become increasingly 
important in this process.  As shown by Zimmerman, preliminary results addressing non-
monetary incentives are promising and show potential retention improvement and cost 
savings for the Navy.  While her research shows promise for the opportunity to utilize 
non-monetary incentives such as choice of home port assignment or the opportunity to 
earn specialty certification in the sailor’s field of specialty4, there are complicating 
factors that must be addressed to achieve success in instituting such a program.   
Complicating factors associated with non-monetary incentive implementation 
occur on the side of individual sailors, and must be fully explored.  Specifically, how 
sailors value individual non-monetary incentives and combinations of non-monetary 
incentives is not fully understood.  Additionally, particular combinations of incentives 
might be more or less cost effective for the Navy to administer, or valued more or less by 
the sailor, and therefore offer greater potential retention benefits or cost savings for the 
Navy.  Finally, the variability that is present in the valuation of incentives could 
potentially affect the outcomes of a program designed to offer non-monetary incentives.  
These complicating factors are the basis for this research.   
This research explores an extensive background of work associated with retention 
behaviors and the current policies in place to encourage retention.  A review of current 
                                                 
2 United States General Accounting Office, Military Personnel:  Management and Oversight of 
Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program Needs Improvement (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2002), 5.  http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03149.pdf (accessed: 22 January 2009). 
3 United States Department of the Navy, Department of the Navy Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 Budget 
Estimates Submission, Justification of Estimates, February 2008, Military Personnel, Navy (Washington, 
D.C.:  Government Printing Office, 2008), 85.  
http://www.finance.hq.navy.mil/FMB/09PRES/MPN_Book.pdf (accessed 22 January 2009). 
4 Zimmerman, “Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives.” 
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research associated with non-monetary retention incentives and the complicating factors 
on the “sailor-side” of this topic are addressed as well.  Overall, this thesis addresses the 
issues that most significantly affect the successful implementation of a Combinatorial 
Retention Auction Incentive Program.  
B. ORGANIZATION OF THIS STUDY 
This thesis is a continuation of a larger ongoing investigation being conducted by 
Dr. William Gates and Dr. Peter Coughlan of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
California.  This line of research has focused on the potential opportunities for the United 
States Navy to enjoy improved retention of service members at lower costs.  To 
accomplish this they have investigated various models of how monetary bonuses are 
offered.  These include a tremendous body of work devoted to auction-based 
compensation.  As a method of fully exploring bonus activity, non-monetary incentives 
have also been addressed, and their research continues here.   
While numerous options have been explored, including the use of auction-style 
mechanisms to administer bonuses, the way in which service members value individual 
and packages of non-monetary incentives is also a significant aspect of retention 
incentive research.  Implementation of any non-monetary incentive program must address 
individual preferences, and is a significant component of this thesis. 
A thorough literature review and a review of current research devoted to this topic 
has revealed several student theses related to the design and implementation of auction 
mechanisms, as well as whether alternative mechanisms offer a cost effectiveness from a 
retention perspective.  These are presented in Table 1 below.  
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Table 1.   Significant Related Research 
Author Year Significant Findings 
Bock5 2007 The Sequential Self-Selection Auction Mechanism S3M can 
produce significant cost savings for the military. 
Denmond, Johnson, 
Lewis, and Zegley6 
2007 Combinatorial Auctions (monetary and non-monetary incentive 
combinations)  result in cost-savings to the military 
Cook7 2008 The second price auction format results in decreased economic
rent (cost savings), and retains service members that are more 
willing to stay (which can be translated into "happier force") 
Zimmerman8 2008 Combinatorial Auctions (monetary and non-monetary incentive 
combinations) provide the opportunity for service members to
gain more value from their bonus while decreasing the actual costs
to the military 
In support of the idea that bonus taking behavior of today’s sailors are different 
than in the past, Chapter II is devoted to evaluating the appeal of non-monetary 
incentives as potentially part of a retention program.  Additionally, Chapter II evaluates 
the results of four Chief of Naval Personnel “Quick Polls” that address the question of 
“what do sailors want?” 
Chapter III focuses on the nature of variability in incentive preferences.  There are 
several factors of variability to address.  These include variability across individual 
incentives, variability across different populations, variability in the valuation of multiple 
incentives within a population, and finally, differences in valuation of individual 
incentives versus combinations of incentives.   
The Chapter IV discusses auctions as a force-shaping tool.  Auction variations, 
specifically as they apply in the retention context, are also addressed.  
 
                                                 
5 Paul B. Bock, “The sequential self-selection auction mechanism for selective reenlistment bonuses: 
potential cost savings to the U.S. Marine Corps,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
6 Constance M. Denmond, Derek N. Johnson, Chavius G. Lewis, and Christopher R. Zegley, 
“Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied to the Selection of Surface Warfare Incentives,” (MBA 
Professional Report, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007). 
7 Benjamin M. Cook, “Using a second-price auction to set military retention bonus levels: an 
application to the Australian Army,” (Master’s Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008). 
8 Zimmerman, “Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives.” 
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Chapter V addresses the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism.  In this 
discussion, the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism is explained, and is 
compared to the Universal Incentive Package, (two versions) in terms of ability to adjust 
for variability.  Additionally, these are compared on level of flexibility in meeting 
individual preferences.  
Chapter VI of this thesis addresses the preference elicitation problem, and the 
multiple complexities associated with administering CRAM.  Assumptions that affect the 
model motivated in this research are also addressed.  Chapter VII provides supporting 
conclusions and recommendations.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The questions of how to structure bonus systems and to whom to offer the bonus 
are critical in developing a successful bonus system.  Understanding the value service 
members place on non-monetary incentives a non-monetary incentive program could be 
structured to exploit the values of various incentives as determined by service members.  
To fully investigate this question, this thesis will investigate the following questions: 
1. Primary Research Question 
The primary research question to be addressed, given the assumption that the 
CRAM offers an opportunity to retain the required number of sailors at a lower cost, and 
potentially greater individual satisfaction:   
How does the variability in valuations of non-monetary incentives (NMIs) impact 
the proper use of such incentives as a force-shaping tool? 
The primary assumption supporting this question is that service members will 
place varying values on retention incentives based upon their personal situation and 
tastes.  Individual preferences are a significant focus of this research.  It is also assumed 
that individuals are unique and some sailors will place more or less value on various 
combinations of incentives than others.  Taking into account the individual sailors’ 
valuation of incentives, ultimately it may be possible to provide an equivalent value of 
retention incentive to sailors at a lower overall cost to the Navy.   
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2. Secondary Research Questions 
Secondary research questions that will be evaluated include: 
• What different types of variability in valuations exist? 
• How significant is each type of variability? 
• What are the implications of each type of variability for the effective 
provision of NMIs? 
• How does the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) 
accommodate each type of variability? 
• Are there simple variations of the CRAM that still accommodate all types 
of variability? 
Addressing these questions will begin to offer personnel planners and policy 
makers the opportunity to develop retention incentives to better meet the Navy’s 
personnel requirements.  
D. SCOPE 
To answer these questions, this thesis will focus on determining which individual 
non-monetary incentives and combinations of non-monetary incentives are most desired 
by the respondent population.  Additionally, these combinations will be analyzed in terms 
of whether various combinations of non-monetary incentives hold greater or lower value 
together, than the sum of their individual values.  The variability present in these 
valuations must be evaluated to fully understand the implications related to CRAM 
implementation. This knowledge will enable personnel planners to offer the right mix of 
incentives to meet personnel retention goals.  While the findings discussed here apply 
only to the populations represented from the stated data sets, the findings may be 
expanded to address the tendencies of similar populations, particularly in the U.S. Navy. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
As previously stated, the purpose of this research is to investigate how sailors 
value combinations of non-monetary incentives as part of a retention package, as well as 
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determine whether the military needs to adjust for variability in incentive valuation when 
included as part of a Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism.  Two relatively recent 
surveys have been administered to service personnel to understand which non-monetary 
incentives might be most attractive to Navy personnel, and how much value individuals 
place on these incentives.  These surveys asked respondents to identify the cash bonus 
that would be required to entice them to retain on active duty for a fixed period of time.  
Once the individual baseline bonus was established the survey then asked respondents to 
identify how much of the monetary bonus they would give up in lieu of various non-
monetary incentives.   
This thesis presents an overview of previous applicable research and how their 
outcomes affect current research.  Additionally, the scope of the current SRB policy 
dilemma, and the study of auctions as they could potentially apply to the SRB problem as 
discussed.   
The magnitude of the preference variability among sailors and the potential 
CRAM model implications of this variability will be examined.  The research approach is 
based upon data taken directly from the Surface Warfare Officer and Enlisted Retention 
Studies respectively.  These studies are more fully addressed in Chapter II.  
Zimmerman used the Crystal Ball simulation program to elicit retention cost and 
value to sailors based upon sailor specified criteria.  In her study, each individual sailor 
and their preferences were considered in developing a “bid” that was used to determine 
his / her retention under the model.  Her simulations were based upon the results of the 
Enlisted Retention Study, which provided data to model a reverse, multiple attribute, 
second-price auction.  She was successful in showing the theory and utility of the model 
she used to meet retention targets with a significant cost savings. 
Given the nature of multiple attributes (in this case individual preferences and 
valuations), it would be very time consuming to consider each individual and 
combination of preferences for every sailor.  As a method of decreasing the complexity 
of the model, and therefore the necessity of obtaining information from each individual 
sailor about every possible combination of available incentives, this thesis hypothesizes 
 9
that the sailor valuation of all incentive combinations can be modeled as strictly additive 
over the individual incentive values.  To explore this hypothesis, we alter the model to 
assume that individual preferences are purely additive, and analyze whether the results of 
the simplified mechanism differ significantly from the results obtained by Zimmerman.  
It would simplify implementation if similar results can be obtained without requiring the 
tremendous workload of eliciting every combinatorial preference from each and every 
sailor.  
F. DATA SETS 
The data used for this research is derived from the two surveys previously 
identified.  Given the nature of the questions posed in the surveys, it is assumed that the 
answers returned represent the true valuation individuals place on the respective 
incentives, and can be considered reliable enough to simulate actual behavior, but not 
precisely accurate conclusions.  These data sets, along with four personnel surveys 
administered by the Chief of Naval Personnel, will be more fully explored in Chapter III. 
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II. THE APPEAL OF NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES 
Volumes have been written about the theory and application of retention 
incentives to today’s military.  Recent research on which this thesis is based addressed 
whether there is an opportunity to improve the method by which retention bonuses are 
administered in the United States Navy.   
Non-monetary incentives represent one way in which personnel planners can offer 
retention incentives at a lower overall cost to the Navy, while also potentially meeting the 
personal goals of the individual sailor.  While civilian organizations have long taken 
advantage of the flexibility that comes with such programs, the military has only recently 
begun to take a concentrated look at this area.   
A. SCOPE OF THE SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUS DILEMMA 
The selective reenlistment bonus is a tool that policy makers use to shape the 
military services with the right number of people with the right skills necessary to carry 
out the military’s multiple and varied missions.  The idea of paying a Selective 
Reenlistment Bonus is not new.  In fact, an SRB was first considered by our founding 
father, George Washington.  As early as 1776, Washington wrote to Congress: 
That if Congress have any reason to believe, that there will be occasion for 
Troops another year, and consequently of another enlistment, they would 
save money and have infinitely better troops if they were, even at a bounty 
of twenty, thirty or more dollars, to engage the men already enlisted.9 
In his letter, Washington expressed the nature of the retention problem with 
brevity and clarity.  Obviously he understood the benefit of a bonus to retain service 
members with the skills a military requires.  But, knowing the benefit of retention does 




                                                 
9 John C. Fitzpatrick (ed.), The Writings of George Washington, Vol. 4, Washington, D.C.:  U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1931, 317. 
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are less expensive or more easily replaced and retention of those who are either hard to 
access or costly to replace.  The latter is becoming more challenging in today’s 
environment.  
While the selective reenlistment bonus is a flexible tool to address retention 
needs, it is not without problems.  The current method of administering SRB’s is outlined 
in the following section, and sheds light on the nature of the problem.  Arguably the most 
troubling aspect of the SRB dilemma is the possibility of decreasing marginal returns.  
The introductory chapter of this thesis discussed the magnitude of change related to 
payment of SRBs over the past several years.  The selective reenlistment bonus 
requirement has dramatically outpaced the force structure requirement resulting in 
significantly higher SRBs required to retain the same number of service personnel.   
A natural question that arises from the increasing SRB requirement over time is 
whether service members are becoming less responsive to SRBs over time.  To date, no 
studies have provided conclusive evidence that service members have become less 
responsive to SRB offerings.  For example, Hansen and Wenger (2005) concluded that 
while sailors have changed over time, their responsiveness to changes in pay, bonus, etc. 
have not.10  This still leaves the question of the increasing SRBs over time.  The nature of 
offering more reenlistment bonus dollars to retain the same number of sailors does lead 
one to question whether there might be a decrease in responsiveness.  
B. BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL QUICK POLLS (WHAT DO 
SAILORS WANT?) 
The Bureau of Naval Personnel conducts research for the Department of the 
Navy, including surveys designed to determine sailor’s satisfaction with all aspects of 
Naval service.  Generally these surveys are fielded as “Quick Polls” designed to test the 
“pulse” of the Navy.   
Officer and Sailor satisfaction are key indicators of retention propensity and 
probability, the results of which can provide useful information for personnel planners. 
                                                 
10 Michael Hansen & Jennie W. Wenger,  Is the Pay Responsiveness of Enlisted Personnel 
Decreasing? Defence and Peace Economics.  Vol 16 (1); February, 29-43. 
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Included below are the significant findings of four separate surveys administered since 
2003.  Each of these lends insight to the attitudes of sailors from various segments of the 
Naval Service.  
1. Selective Reenlistment Bonus Quick Poll11 
• Fielded February, 2003:  458 respondents in grades E4-E6 
• Of those SRB eligible, SRB was ranked highest in regards to affecting 
reenlistment intention; of those not SRB eligible, geographic location and 
choice of job assignment ranked highest in regards to affecting 
reenlistment intention (but only 31% indicated becoming eligible for an 
SRB would be a factor in this decision)  
• 67% of those eligible to reenlist would not reenlist if an SRB were not 
offered 
2. Surface Warfare Officer Quick Poll12 
• Fielded June, 2004:  4,448 Surface Warfare Officers in grade O1-O4 
• 2,128 respondents  (47% response rate) 
• A number of incentives, including guaranteed education and geographic 
stability after Department Head tours ranked higher than SWO 
Continuation Pay (SWOCP) as affecting potential continuation decisions 
• Officers in all grades indicated an increased propensity to continue as the 
level of SWOCP increased, indicating increasing SWOCP would likely 
result in greater continuation 
                                                 
11 Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology (2003).  Selective Reenlistment Bonus Quick 
Poll.  Millington, TN:  C. Newell; K. Whittam; Z. Uriell. 
12 Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology (2004).  Surface Warfare Officers (SWO) 
Continuation Intentions Quick Poll.  Millington, TN:  C. Newell; K. Whittam; Z. Uriell. 
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3. Medical Department Officer Quick Poll13 
• Fielded May, 2005:  10,872 Medical Department Officers 
• 3,582 Respondents (33% response rate) 
• Across the Medical Department, both choice of job assignment and choice 
of geographic location for next assignment ranked higher than retention 
bonus, in terms of increasing the likelihood to remain on active duty  
4. 2007 Retention Quick Poll14 
• Fielded December 2007 to January 2008:  8,000 sailors, random sample 
• Obtained a 43% response rate 
• Top three incentives to reenlist / continue: 
o Enlisted:   Increase base pay; Choice of geographic location;  
  Increase bonus 
o Officer: Increase base pay;  Choice of geographic location;  
  Choice of next assignment 
It is important to note that in all surveys which asked the question, an increase in 
Basic Pay was found to be a significant factor in reenlistment/continuation decisions.  
Basic pay increase consistently ranked among the top five indicators of 
reenlistment/continuation intention.  
The results of this series of quick polls are interesting in terms of effects that can 
be found related to retention and continuation decisions.  At a minimum, these surveys 
lend support to the assumptions postulated in the series of studies related to non-
monetary incentives as a viable alternative to monetary only offerings.   
                                                 
13 Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology (2005), 2005 Medical Officer Quick Poll. 
Millington, TN: C. Newell; K. Whittam, Z. Uriell. 
14 Navy Personnel Research, Studies, and Technology (2007),  2007 Retention Quick Poll. Millington, 
TN:  Schultz, R.; C. Newell; K. Whittam, Z. Uriell. 
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III. VARIABILITY IN NON-MONETARY INCENTIVE 
VALUATIONS 
Before discussing how incentives might be considered as a part of compensation, 
it is imperative to make a distinction between costs and value as they apply to the line of 
research examined in this field.  Costs represent the relative expense that the Navy would 
bear to provide a given incentive to the service member.  In terms of this thesis and the 
research reviewed, cost includes the cost of providing non-monetary incentives, as well 
as the cost of any additional monetary bonus.  As discussed in the methodology section of 
the above studies, up to this point cost has been measured against a relative valuation 
determined by the surveyed population.  If the Navy is able to reasonably approximate 
the actual cost to provide various non-monetary incentives, then accuracy in determining 
the effects of the models will be greatly improved.  
Value is a relative term.  The value of an item, object, or incentive is assigned by 
the person who is evaluating the item.  The concept of value versus cost is significant in 
determining incentive offerings, as well as the overall results of savings achieved by the 
Navy and value gained by the sailor.  If an individual service member values an incentive 
more than it costs the Navy to provide, then both the Navy and individual gain from 
providing this incentive as part of a retention package.  How much of a gain the 
individual receives is determined by how much the individual values the incentive.  
To illustrate the concepts of costs and value, consider the following example:  
A sailor in San Diego is entitled to a selective reenlistment bonus of fifty 
thousand dollars.  The sailor might choose to give up $10,000 of his bonus for the 
opportunity to remain in San Diego rather than PCS across country to Norfolk, VA.  
Likely the costs of allowing the sailor to stay in San Diego are near zero for the Navy, but 
have a value of $10,000 to the sailor.  In this case, the sailor gets value for his SRB 
dollar, and the Navy incurs a decreased retention cost.   
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Given the nature of economic conditions today, opinion recognizes that non-
monetary incentives are a powerful tool when utilized in conjunction with monetary 
incentives.  In a recent article, Sarah Pierce (2008) evaluates the idea when economic 
conditions make employers hesitant to offer raises that non-monetary incentives serve as 
excellent substitutes to maintain employee satisfaction and morale.  Her report outlines 
the rationale of why employees who are at least satisfied with their current compensation 
level might be just as happy with “perks” as they are with increases in salary.  The non-
monetary ideas discussed in this article could generally be categorized as “recognition for 
a job well done,” but rest basically in the idea that employees are satisfied if they feel 
they have a say in their position, and that the work they perform is valued15.  While this 
report is directed toward private sector businesses, the principles are easily applied to the 
military services given the constraining nature of compensation alternatives available to 
service members.     
In addition, considering the value that respondents have for individual incentives, 
a thorough evaluation must also include the value that individuals hold for various 
combinations of non-monetary incentives.  It is certainly within the realm of possibility 
that individuals may value the combination of two incentives more or less than the sum 
of their individual values.  The concept of the “supra-additive” or “sub-additive” values 
for combinations of incentives is crucial to the construct of this thesis.  Both the Surface 
Warfare Officer study and the Enlisted Retention study elicited values for combinations 
of incentives from the respondents.  In these studies, respondents returned valuations for 
the combinations of incentives that fell into each of the three categories:  additive; sub-
additive; or supra-additive.   
To demonstrate the nature of additive, sub-additive, and supra-additive incentive 
valuations, Table 2 below shows the concepts of each based on the valuations an 
individual might place on given incentives.   
                                                 
15 S. Pierce 2008,  3 Perks That Work in Lieu of Raises.  Entrepreneur.com.  accessed 21 February, 
2009, from http://www.entrepreneur.com/humanresources/compensationandbenefits/article197416.html. 
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Table 2.   Additive, Sub-Additive, Supra-Additive Demonstrated 
 Value Individual Places on Each Incentive 
Category Homeport Geographic Stability 
Value Individual Places on 




Additive 10000 15000 25000 1 
Sub-Additive 10000 15000 19000 0.76 
Supra-Additive 10000 15000 40000 1.6 
 
As you can see from Table 2, there are different ways in which employees may 
value individual incentives and combinations of incentives.  As we begin to increase the 
number of incentives that are offered, the potential for variability across offerings 
increases as well.  The lower limits of any combination of incentives will always be zero, 
as it is possible that at least one person from any representative sample will have no value 
for the stated combination. The upper limit however can change dramatically given the 
supra-additive nature by which some individuals value various incentive combinations.   
The two previous reports described below are the basis for the calculations 
analyzing the preference elicitation problems in this thesis. The valuations expressed in 
these data sets are used to further understand preference variability.  
A. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
1. Surface Warfare Officer Study 
The Surface Warfare Officer Study (SWO) was conducted as part of the MBA 
professional report completed by Denmond et al. (2007), and focused on efforts in the 
Surface Warfare Officer community to retain pre-department head officers through their 
second Department Head tour.  Evaluation focused on the Surface Warfare Officer 
Continuation Pay as a retention incentive compared to combinatorial offerings that 
included non-monetary incentives designed to retain the needed officers by addressing 
quality of life factors as well as monetary incentives.  
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a. Methodology 
The authors of this study fielded a survey asking Surface Warfare Officers 
what monetary bonus would be required for the officer to retain on active duty for two 
department head tours.  The survey then inquired what portion of the bonus the officer 
would forego in lieu of various non-monetary incentives and combinations of these 
incentives.  To motivate the combinatorial auction there must be some form of monetary 
incentive “bid” upon which to assess the value of non-monetary incentives.  The foregone 
amounts in this study were considered “bids” in the combinatorial auction.  The study 
assumed that the amount of bonus (in dollars) the officer would give up is the value the 
officer placed on that particular incentive.   
The incentives in this study included:   
Cash    Combination: Homeport Choice and Ship Choice 
Homeport of Choice    Homeport Choice and Billet Type  
Ship Type of Choice    Billet Type and Ship Type 
Billet Type of Choice    Homeport, Billet and Ship (all 3) 
Once the valuation of each Officer’s preferences was recorded in an Excel 
spreadsheet, each individual incentive “bid” was calculated against the theoretical costs 
to provide the incentive and cash required by the bidder, if the bidder were to be selected 
for retention.  Because there was no incentive cost data, the “cost” of individual 
incentives was set at the 50th percentile of the survey groups’ valuation for a particular 
incentive.  For example, the 50th percentile valuation of the incentive “homeport choice” 
was $5,000.  Respondents were offered this incentive if their individual stated value for 
the incentive was greater than $5,000.  If their valuation was less, then they were not 
offered this incentive. 
Based upon the bids placed by individual officers, the value of each 
officer’s incentive package was derived from the combination of their cash bids and the 
value of their non-monetary incentive surplus.  Surplus is defined as the excess value an 
officer would receive above the cost for the Navy to provide a particular non-monetary 
incentive.  Table 3 below demonstrates how incentive packages were valued.  
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After calculating the package valuation, the packages were ranked from 
least to most expensive.  In this case, the retention target was 117 officers, so the 117 
officers with the lowest cost packages were retained.   
Table 3.   Package Valuation for a Notional Officer16 
Bid for a Notional Officer 
   Bid Costs Difference Awarded 
Base Bonus Required (min to retain) 
150000     
Homeport 20000 5000 15000   
Ship Type 10000 0 10000   
Billet 10000 1250 8750   
Homeport/Billet 25000 10000 15000   
Homeport/Ship 50000 7500 42500 Yes 
Ship/Billet 20000 5000 15000   
Homeport/Ship/Billet 50000 15000 35000   
Sabbatical 10000 5000 5000 Yes 
Telecommuting 20000 5000 15000 Yes 
Geographic Stability 10000 5000 5000 Yes 
       
Inc. Cost to the Navy:   7500 + 5000 + 5000 + 5000 
  22500     
       
Adjust Bonus:           
Bonus Bid minus Incentive Valuations for awarded incentives 
  150000 - 50000 - 10000 - 20000 - 10000 
  60000     
Effective Cost to the Navy is:  Adjusted Bonus plus Cost of Incentive 
  82500     
If the cost of the First Excluded Incentive Package is 101,250, the adjusted cash bonus is: 
Adjusted Cash Bonus 101250 - 82500 + 60000  = 78750 
       
Now add new adjusted cash bonus to incentive value for the officers’ incentive value   
Total package value is  78750 + 50000 + 10000 + 20000 + 10000 
Total package value is  $168,750.00       
 
                                                 
16 Denmond et al., “Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied,” 78. 
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b. Significant Findings 
This study estimated a significant cost savings to the Navy to retain the 
required number of Surface Warfare Officers.  Of the required 117 officers targeted in 
their auction, the total cost to retain using purely monetary incentives was over twenty 
million dollars. By combining monetary and non-monetary incentives, the Navy was able 
to provide the average officer $60,000 more in incentive value to the officer, at a savings 
of more than eight million dollars to the Navy.  The combinatorial auction price averaged 
a $73,000 savings per officer.  The Navy saved money and the officer gained value from 
his continuation package over the monetary only offering.17   
2. Enlisted Retention Study 
The Enlisted Retention Study was conducted to continue the string of research 
addressing non-monetary incentives as part of a retention effort in the Navy. The author 
fielded a survey to two ratings of enlisted service members formatted in a similar fashion 
as the surface warfare officer Study.  The methodology of this study followed very 
closely the initial development of the surface warfare officer study, but used slightly 
different cost estimations in the excel model.  This will be further explained in the 
methodology section below.  
a. Methodology 
As indicated, the data for this survey was obtained in a similar fashion as 
the Surface Warfare Officer study.  Of note, the available incentive offerings were 
expanded and two groups of combinations, each involving three incentives were available 
rather than the one offering of three incentives in the SWO survey.   
Incentive offerings included: 
 
Homeport   Professional Certification in field/trade 
Platform   Compressed Workweek 
Billet    Transferability of GI Bill benefits to family 
                                                 
17 Denmond et al., “Combinatorial Auction Theory Applied,” 67. 
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One Year Sabbatical  Single barracks room while assigned to ship 
Telecommuting In-port BAH while assigned to ship 
Geographic Stability 2 tours Geographic Stability 3 tours 
Lump Sum SRB 
Combinations:  Homeport / GeoStability 2 tours 
   Homeport / Compressed Workweek 
   GeoStability 2 tours / Compressed Workweek 
   Homeport / GeoStability 2 tours / Compressed Workweek 
   Lump Sum SRB / Telecommuting 
   Lump Sum SRB / Homeport 
   Homeport / Telecommuting 
   Lump Sum SRB / Homeport / Telecommuting  
To differentiate her study, as well as gain other additional information, 
Zimmerman simulated the data from survey respondents using three different approaches 
to structuring incentive packages:  Monetary only, Universal Incentive Package (a one-
size fits all incentive package), and Combinatorial (individualized incentive packages).  
Each model was simulated as a reverse second price auction. Also, each model was 
simulated at the 25, 50 and 75% retention levels.  
The first calculated model (monetary only) was used to assess the cost to 
achieve various retention levels using purely cash retention incentives.  As expected, the 
bonus received per sailor increases as the retention level increases from 25% to 50% to 
75%. 
The Universal Incentive Package was more difficult to motivate.  This 
model was used to determine the utility individuals gain from a standardized incentive 
package offered to all service members.  To effectively determine which non-monetary 
incentives to include in the universal incentive package, the analysis calculated the cost 
for each non-monetary incentive (NMI) where the total sailor value equaled the total cost 
to provide that NMI to all service members.  This cut-off occurred at approximately the 
75th percentile in the service member’s value distribution; this was considered an 
adequate approximation for purposes of this model.   Only NMI’s whose costs were less 
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than the 75% percentile of the value distribution were offered in the universal incentive 
package.  The results of each bid were then calculated in a similar fashion as described in 
Table 2 above, and ranked accordingly.   
The Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism was motivated in a 
similar manner as the SWO study.  The cost assignments in this study were based on two 
methods.  The first simulation, termed VP(AP), or Variable Price-All Positive assumed 
that NMI costs fell somewhere in the positive range of the values submitted by the survey 
respondents, ranging from the lowest to the highest positive value reported.  The second 
simulation, termed VP(HP), or Variable Price—High Positive, assumed that NMI costs 
fell somewhere in the upper half of the range of positive values reported. For both 
scenarios, 1,000 trials were simulated (using Crystal Ball simulation software) selecting 
different costs from the relevant range for each NMI. 
In each of these cases, again, the sailor was only offered a given incentive 
if his valuation for the incentive was greater than the Navy’s cost to provide it.  Each 
package was calculated in the manner described in Table 2 above.  The results were 
ranked accordingly.   
b. Significant Findings 
Findings from the Enlisted Retention study are quite impressive, and 
significant.  First, the combinatorial auction selecting personalized portfolios of retention 
incentives certainly offers the opportunity to decrease retention costs over the current 
system.  As well, sailors received the optimal mix of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives to meet their personal needs and situation, resulting in “happier” sailors.  
Based upon these assumptions, and for the given set of survey 
respondents, Zimmerman (2008) demonstrated that CRAM provides significant potential 
cost savings for the Navy, on the order of 30% or more.  Her results also indicate that the 
highest cost savings occur at the highest retention levels, which intuitively is accurate.   
While both studies show significant cost savings using CRAM to 
personalize individual incentive packages, they also show there is substantial variability 
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in preferences.  This analysis will examine the data contained in these studies to further 
evaluate the nature of variability over individual preferences, across NMIs, across groups, 
across people within a group, and across combinations of NMIs for an individual.   
B. VARIABILITY ACROSS NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES  
1. Variability across Individual Non-monetary Incentives 
Variability is arguably the source (and salvation) of the difficulties present in the 
CRAM as modeled in the identified studies.  In the enlisted retention survey, there is 
tremendous variability in the valuation of individual non-monetary incentives across 
respondents. In the Surface Warfare Officer survey, similar variability is also present, but 
the patterns of variability are different.  
Figure 1 below shows the mean (average) and median (middle value) for each of 
the NMIs offered in the enlisted study. Note that some offerings such as homeport 
preference are highly valued (high mean) and highly sought (high median).  Others such 
as a single barracks room while stationed aboard a ship held almost no value (low mean) 
and were not highly sought (low median).  Finally, transferability of the GI Bill benefits 
showed a third option of highly valued (high mean), but not highly sought (low median).  
It is the difference in how incentives are valued that makes the valuation elicitation 
problem difficult to quantify.  
The difference in average valuation of incentives within a population is also 
important to the nature of this thesis because it implies that different NMIs will have 
different values within a population; the choice of NMIs is important.   Figures 2 and 3 
below show the average valuation of NMIs by the group of respondents from the enlisted 
retention survey.  
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Figure 1.   Variability Across Individual NMIs 
 
 




Figure 3.   Average Value of Non-Monetary Incentives 
As demonstrated, there is wide variability across the average value service 
members place on different non-monetary incentives.  While service members would on 
average give up over seven thousand dollars of their SRB for the option of transferring 
their G.I. Bill benefits to their dependents, they would only give up just over six hundred 
dollars for the option of having a single barracks room in port while stationed aboard 
ship.  Within each of these examples there are individuals who would give up 
significantly more than the average for each of these incentives.  While variability of this 
magnitude could be viewed as an implementation difficulty, it is this variability which 
offers great potential in meeting individual sailor’s requirements in personalized 
incentive packages; this is viewed as a positive attribute in this thesis.  
C. VARIABILITY ACROSS POPULATIONS:  OFFICER VS. ENLISTED 
There are several ways to consider the variability in valuation for incentives that 
exists between different groups.  In the case of the SWO survey and Enlisted Retention 
survey, two well defined groups were questioned regarding similar incentives, under 
similar circumstances.   
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Both the enlisted and officer groups were questioned regarding their valuation of 
the following incentives:  choice of homeport; choice of platform/ship type; and choice of 
billet.  Table 4 and Figure 4 below show the difference in valuation for the non-monetary 
incentives common across the two studies.  The valuations listed are the average amount 
of cash the respondent would sacrifice to obtain the indicated incentive.  It is easy to 
identify the differences in average valuation given to the three incentives by officers and 
enlisted members and the magnitude of the difference.  On average, the officer 
respondents have a higher value for non-monetary incentives than their enlisted 
counterparts.   
 
Table 4.   Difference in Average Valuation of Incentives by group.  Officer 
vs. Enlisted 
   Average Valuation For Incentive: 
Group  Homeport  Ship Type  Billet 
SWO   10,693.71  3,724.49  7,279.95 





Figure 4.   Difference in Average Valuation of Incentives by group.  Officer vs. Enlisted 
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These graphs demonstrate how different groups may value incentives at different 
levels or in different ways.  The variability shown here is another layer of uncertainty 
surrounding the way in which incentives are valued, and again, necessitates an adequate 
method of dealing with the variability inherent in the preference elicitation problem. 
D. VARIABILITY WITHIN A POPULATION 
1. Variability across the Averages of Multiple Non-monetary Incentives 
The variability in the valuation of non-monetary incentives within a population 
was previously described in section B.  Adding yet another dimension to the variability 
equation is the idea that variability is also seen in the valuation for an NMI by members 
within a population.  There are certain non-monetary incentives that, as a whole this 
group of survey respondents values much less than others.  In consideration of the nature 
of variability, this is expected.  In addition, it is important to note that the variation in 
NMI’s preferences across individuals is also important.   
An excellent example of this variability is demonstrated by the responses from the 
Enlisted Retention Survey18 and the range of valuations offered for a guarantee of 
homeport preference.  Figure 5 below demonstrates the variability of results from 
question 5A of the Enlisted Retention Survey, asking the amount of a selective 
reenlistment bonus the respondent would forego to guarantee their homeport of choice.  
                                                 
18 Zimmerman, “Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives,” 131-140. 
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Figure 5.   Home Port Preference Variability 
Obviously there is significant variability in the value that the 531 respondents 
place on the opportunity for homeport preference.  The values given range from zero (no 
value) to fifty thousand dollars (high value).  A scatter diagram of each non-monetary 
incentive offered as part of this research would offer a similar view of the nature of 
valuation across individual incentives.  The magnitude of the variability in valuation 
differs, but the nature of the variability is consistent.  
Valuation as an indicator of personal preference is an excellent tool that can be 
utilized to develop incentive packages that not only take advantage of individual 
preferences, but also allow personnel planners to develop programs that more fully meet 
the desires and expectations of the individual sailor.  However, exploiting these 





To more fully address this point let us reconsider the case of our San Diego sailor: 
Recall he is willing to forego $10,000 of his bonus to remain in San Diego.  The 
sailor’s shipmate on the other hand joined the Navy to see the world and really doesn’t 
have a preference for choosing a home port.  The shipmate would prefer to choose a 
specific type of ship he feels has a heightened operational tempo, furthering the 
likelihood of his “seeing the world.”  The shipmate might hold no value for home port 
preference, but would forego his own cash bonus to choose his ship type and increase his 
own utility (seeing the world).  
The graph above, and subsequent explanation and example, are representative of 
the type of variability one might expect from a group of people.  Some respondents might 
place high value on a given incentive, while others might place less value on the same 
incentive.  The variability in how people value individual incentives is one important 
element of the variability problem.   
E. VARIABILITY IN STANDALONE VS. COMBINATION INCENTIVES 
Another complicating factor to the already murky preference/valuation elicitation 
problem occurs when combinations of incentives are offered for consideration.  You may 
recall that Chapter III defined the concepts of additive, sub-additive, and supra-additive 
preferences.  Additivity is measured by dividing the stated valuation of the incentive 
combination by the sum of the stated valuations for each of the incentives in isolation.  
Measuring the additivity of incentives in this way, a ratio of 1.0 indicates that individual 
incentives are perfectly additive.  Less than 1 or greater than 1 indicates sub-additive or 
supra-additive valuation respectively.  This section discusses these concepts in relation to 
the SWO and Enlisted Retention studies.   
It is important to know how individuals value combinations of incentives.  From 
an implementation standpoint, knowledge of which individual and combinations of 
incentives offer the best response, and how they are valued, is vital information. At the 
minimum, if combinations of incentives are valued more or less than individual 
incentives, a policy can be implemented to support the desires of those who will 
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ultimately be affected by the policy.  But, once again, variability in the way individual 
versus combination incentives are valued is present.  
Variability as it applies to several different situations has been addressed in 
preceding sections.  Table 5 below shows the relative additive, sub-additive, or supra-
additive nature of the valuation of incentives returned from the Enlisted Retention and 
Surface Warfare Studies.  It is important to note the difference in the relative additive 
nature of each combination in the enlisted study, and contrast these with the results from 
the SWO study. 
Table 5.    Variability in Standalone versus Combinations of Incentives 
Enlisted Study 
        
Two Incentive Combinations Three Incentive Combo 
HP & Geo HP & CWW Geo & CWW HP, GEO & CWW 
0.571 0.511 0.569 0.564 
         
LumpSRB 
&Telecom 
LumpSRB & HP Telecom & HP LumpSRB, Telecom & HP
0.443 0.541 0.416 0.439 
         
         
SWO Study 
        
Two Incentive Combinations Three Incentive Combo 
HP & Billet HP & Ship Ship & Billet Combination all 3 
0.905 0.859 0.742 1.060 
 
Easily identifiable are the differences in valuation that respondents offered for 
various two and three incentive combinations.  These results indicate that overall, enlisted 
members value combinations of incentive much less than they value the sum of 
individual incentives.  Even though the overall results are sub-additive, there were 
numerous individual cases in which the results were supra-additive.   
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Take the case of respondent 625356940.  The sum of his valuation for the 
individual incentives Home Port, Geographic Stability (2 tours), and Compressed Work 
Week were ten thousand, twenty five thousand, and five thousand dollars respectively.  If 
he were offered the combination of all three incentives he would have given up seventy 
five thousand dollars, or more descriptively, the entirety of his bonus.  Obviously his 
valuation of NMI’s was supra-additive.   
In contrast to the enlisted results, officers seem to value combinations of two 
incentives at a higher level than the enlisted group, but preferences are not quite at fully 
additive; in contrast, the three incentive combination was valued as slightly supra-
additive. 
Once again, you will note the variability that is present not only among 
individuals, but also between the two groups.  These differences compound the 
preference elicitation problem.   
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION:  WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN? 
In conclusion of Chapter III, it is important to note the sources of variability in 
personal preferences across NMIs.  To begin, this chapter demonstrated that values differ 
significantly across NMIs.  Continuing on, variability in the valuation of incentives 
across groups was demonstrated by contrasting average valuations from the officer and 
enlisted groups.  Third, variability in the valuation of incentives across individuals within 
a group was demonstrated.  Finally, the variability that is present between individual 
incentive offering and combinations of incentives was addressed.  The following chapters 
will further address this variability, particularly sub- and supra-additivity within 
combinations of incentives to determine its significance and how this variability affects 
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IV. AUCTIONS AS A FORCE-SHAPING TOOL 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Auction-based retention mechanisms are an evolving aspect of military personnel 
management efforts.  While the context of this research focuses on retention auctions 
there are multiple other opportunities to use these same mechanisms in other areas.  This 
chapter describes the current selective reenlistment bonus system and how SRBs are 
determined.  Continuing on, this chapter also identifies types of auctions and their 
application to the retention picture.  Finally, it discusses current and recent Department of 
Defense uses of auction mechanisms, as well as the driving forces for using auction 
mechanisms as force-shaping and retention tools. 
B. TRADITIONAL SELECTIVE REENLISTMENT BONUS VERSUS 
AUCTION-BASED BONUS 
1. Selective Reenlistment Bonus  
Zimmerman (2008) provided a thorough review of the way in which SRBs are 
currently determined by the Navy.  To paraphrase her assessment, the Navy must 
determine, and then pay, the SRB amount required to entice the most reluctant sailor that 
must reenlist to meet end-strength requirements.19  While this method of establishing 
SRBs will effectively retain the required number of sailors, it also results in the Navy 
paying more willing sailors (even those who would have reenlisted for no bonus at all) 
the same bonus as the “most expensive” or reluctant sailor.  This process results in the 
Navy paying economic rent for sailors that would have stayed for less cost.  The current 
system of selective reenlistment bonus setting does not produce the most cost effective 
SRB system and potentially increases the Navy’s retention cost over other mechanisms.  
Figure 6 below demonstrates the two significant problems associated with current 
SRB determination.  In this example the Marine Corps wants to retain 3,000 marines.  
The first problem occurs in determining the correct bonus to retain the desired number of 
                                                 
19 Zimmerman, “Integrating Monetary and Non-monetary Reenlistment Incentives,” 10. 
 34
Marines.  If the SRB is set too low, the Marines will fall short of their retention goal.  If 
the SRB is too high, they will overshoot their retention goal and be forced to suspend 
reenlistments.   
The shaded area represents the second problem associated with a one price SRB 
offering, the “economic rent” that the Marine Corps has to pay to retain the desired 
number of Marines.  Approximately ¼ of the Marines retained would have reenlisted for 
no bonus at all, yet they receive the full $7,000 bonus.  The excess bonus that is paid to 
all Marines below the 3,000th Marine is money that potentially could be recouped if the 
retention mechanism were motivated in some other fashion. 
 
Figure 6.   Problems with SRB Determination20 
2. Auction Variations 
As described early in this thesis, evaluating auction-based bonus systems is an 
area of research whose focus is limiting the amount of excess bonus offering and 
therefore retaining the required number of sailors at a lower overall cost.  An auction is 
defined as the sale of something in which potential purchasers bid against one another for 
the right to buy the item.  There are several types of auction mechanisms that can be 
                                                 
20 Peter J. Coughlan, “Mechanism Design for Defense Management:  A Research Agenda and 
Representative Illustration,” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 20 November 2008). 
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utilized for retention purposes. The type of auction format chosen depends on how the 
program is to be administered.  For the purposes of this thesis we will discuss auctions in 
terms of forward and reverse auctions, and first and second price auctions.  
a. Forward Auctions 
Forward auctions are similar to the auctions carried out on websites such 
as Ebay.  Generally, there is a single seller and multiple buyers.  An item is offered for 
sale and multiple potential purchasers bid on the item, eventually driving the price of the 
item up.  This type of auction is beneficial for the seller who is seeking to get the highest 
price for his single or multiple items for sale. 
b. Reverse Auctions 
Reverse auctions occur when a buyer seeks a good or service and multiple 
sellers bid on the opportunity to provide the good or service.  Under this type of format, it 
is expected that the single buyer receives multiple offers and can obtain the good or 
service at the lowest possible price, given market conditions at the time.   
c. First Price Auctions 
In first price auctions, the winner is the person with the highest bid and the 
winner pays the amount that he bid.  This is generally the type of auction people envision 
when considering auctions.  First price auctions have utility for the seller in assuring the 
highest possible bid is achieved in a given buyers market.   
d. Second Price Auctions 
The second price auction varies slightly from the first.  The difference in 
this auction is that the person who bids the highest amount wins the auction, but pays the 
second highest bid rather his highest bid.   
Figure 7 below demonstrates the relationship of forward and reverse 
auctions to market activity.  If we consider sailors as sellers of their labor services, and 
multiple sailors are willing to sell their labor service, then market forces will take over 
and drive down the price paid by the buyer (Navy).   
 36
 
Figure 7.   Auction Variations and Their Related Market Forces (From Coughlan, 
Introduction to Economics)21 
e. Sequential (Open Outcry) Auctions 
In sequential or open outcry auctions, all participants or their agents are 
present, physically or virtually, during the auction.  Participants continue to bid as long as 
they are willing to submit a price that beats the current best offer.  The auction ends when 
no one is willing to better the standing offer. 
f. Simultaneous (Sealed-Bid) Auctions 
In simultaneous or sealed bid auctions, all participants have a window of 
time in which they can submit a single bid representing their best offer.  All bids are open 
simultaneously and the winner is declared based on the best submitted offer.  Participants 
do not need to be present when the bids are opened. 
Given deployments and operational tempo for military personnel, sealed-
bid auctions are more appropriate than open outcry auctions for determining retention 
bonuses.  Sealed-bid auctions can be conducted in either a first price or second price 
                                                 
21 Peter J. Coughlan, “Introduction to Auction Economics,” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, 29 November 2004). 
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format. Gamesmanship is a part of the bidding process in first price sealed bid auctions, 
as bidder will try to determine how much they can adjust their bid to increase the surplus 
they capture while still winning the auction.  Second price sealed-bid auctions encourage 
the bidder to bid his actual willingness to pay; there is no potential to gain by 
misrepresenting their willingness to pay.  
g. Single Winner Auctions 
In a single winner auction there is only one item to sell or buy, so there is 
only one winner.   
h. Multiple Winner Auctions 
Multiple winner auctions offer an opportunity, as the name implies, for 
multiple bidders to win an auction.  In the case of retention auctions, the sellers who are 
chosen for retention would be the winners.  
3. Department of Defense Experience with Auction Mechanisms 
The Department of Defense has some experience utilizing auction-based 
mechanisms to achieve personnel management goals.  One recent example includes the 
program of Assignment Incentive Pay.  AIP utilizes a form of auction to achieve its 
personnel management objective.  
Similar to the difficulties the Navy has experienced in retaining the sailors with 
the right skills has been the difficulties the Navy has experienced in encouraging sailors 
to accept certain “less desirable” assignments.  The reluctance to accept may be based on 
type of duty, length of tour, geographic location, or any other of a number of individual 
preferential factors.   
To combat the difficulties of filling less desirable billets, in 2003 the Navy began 
to utilize a program called Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP).  Under AIP sailors who hold 
the correct Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC), are in the correct sea/short rotation, and 
are more willing to accept less desirable duty in exchange for additional compensation 
can apply and “bid” for the duty.  If accepted, the amount bid is paid monthly as extra 
pay. 
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AIP is in essence a reverse auction.  There are multiple bidders willing to accept 
the difficult to fill billet, but only the sailor who meets all requirements and delivers the 
lowest bid will be accepted.  This is a reverse, first price sealed bid auction with a single 
winner.  This type of setup results in market forces determining how to address the 
shortfall.  The Chief of Naval Personnel at the time AIP was introduced, Vice Adm. 
Gerry Hoewing, described AIP as follows: “We are taking advantage of marketplace 
dynamics to get the talent where we need it most, and that innovative approach is making 
us a much more capable and agile force as a result.”22 
In regards to guidance the Department of Defense has been given related to 
auctions, the 10th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation has taken a strong 
position related to the use of auctions as a potential force-shaping tool.  One particular 
recommendation relates to offering bonuses to Medical Department Professionals.  To 
paraphrase the QRMC recommendation, auctions should be a part of everyday business 
practices as a method of retaining the right mix of Medical Department Personnel in a 
cost-effective manner.23  While this citation to the QRMC specifically is looking at the 
opportunity to fill billets which have been traditionally more difficult to fill, the idea 
remains that offering the opportunity for auction based mechanisms is appropriate.  
 
                                                 
22 Chief of Naval Personnel Public Affairs Release,  “Navy Offers Assignment Incentive Pay For 
Billets In Guam And Sasebo,”  Navy.mil website, accessed 19 February 2008 at 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=12187.  
23 U.S. Department of Defense:  Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense.  (February 2008).  Tenth 
Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Volume II.  Washington, DC: Publisher.  81. 
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V. ADDRESSING VARIABLE VALUATIONS I:  THE 
COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM 
Addressing the variability in valuation of non-monetary incentives is the focus of 
this research.  Thus far, this thesis has described the multiple sources of variability that 
are present in personal incentive valuations.  This chapter demonstrates various methods 
of addressing variability and, where possible, compensating for variability.   
There are two options for implementing a non-monetary incentive package 
discussed in the previous research on military retention bonuses: the Universal Incentive 
Package (UIP) and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  While 
both approaches have benefits, CRAM arguably is better able to address variability in 
incentive valuations.  To fully understand the benefits associated with CRAM, the two 
methods are evaluated here.  
A. UNIVERSAL INCENTIVE PACKAGE 
Recall that the basic idea behind implementing non-monetary incentives as a form 
of compensation relies on a basic understanding of how the incentives are valued by the 
target population. The Universal Incentive Package offers a “one size fits all” approach to 
non-monetary incentive implementation.  Basically the UIP attempts to determine how 
the target population values various NMIs, then includes the most attractive incentives as 
part of overall universal retention package.  If overall the population values an incentive 
more than it costs to provide, then that incentive is cost effective as part of the retention 
offering.  In addition to the non-monetary incentive package, members receive a cash 
bonus, which is either pre-determined or determined via auction.24 
While the Universal Incentive Package offers several benefits to both the Navy 
and service members, it also has several deficiencies.  The primary deficiency of the UIP 
is that some service members end up receiving incentives for which the Navy’s cost 
exceeds their value.  This action ends of costing the Navy more than it benefits the sailor.  
The second major problem with UIP is that the package may not include some incentives 
                                                 
24 Coughlan presentation “Mechanism Design for Defense Management,” 20 November 2008. 
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that would otherwise entice service members to retain.  Figure 8 shows the benefits and 
waste generated by the UIP, as well as the benefit potentially gained under CRAM 
(explained in section B) that is not achieved by UIP.  In terms of variable incentive 
valuations, the UIP cannot compensate for variations across individuals within a 
population.  UIP can select the most attractive NMIs and tailor incentives to different 
populations, so it can compensate for differences in valuations across NMIs and across 
populations, but UIP cannot compensate for variability that is present in how individual 
sailors value incentives of for variability in valuations across combinations of incentives.   
 
Figure 8.   Limitation of a Universal Incentive Package25 
 
B. COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISM BASICS 
The combinatorial retention auction mechanism seeks to compensate for the 
variability that is present in valuation of incentives: 
• Across individual incentives 
• Across various populations 
• Within a given population 
• As standalone or in combinations 
                                                 
25 Coughlan presentation “Mechanism Design for Defense Management,” 20 November 2008. 
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The CRAM is a reverse, multiple winner, second price, sealed-bid auction.  The 
“combinatorial” component of CRAM combines non-monetary and monetary incentives 
as part of the auction process.  Service members bid on incentive packages that consist 
of:  (1) A monetary requirement; and (2) Non-monetary incentive valuations. 
Each service member offered retention under CRAM receives an individualized 
package of a monetary bonus and non-monetary incentives based upon their bid.  Their 
bid is derived from the valuation they place on non-monetary incentives.  The Navy’s 
total cost of this package is based upon a second price auction. 
Table 3 in Chapter III (Package Valuation for a Notional Officer), outlined the 
way in which CRAM “bids” are determined.  The individual respondent indicates the 
minimum cash bonus required to remain on active duty for a specified period of time.  
For each incentive that the bidder values, the amount of cash they are willing to forego is 
indicated.  If the respondent values an incentive more than it cost to provide, that 
incentive is included in the retention package.  The set of lowest-cost service members to 
retain is determined.   
Each service member retained under this method receives:  
• The set of non-monetary incentives included in their bid 
• Cash bonus equivalent to the total cost of the first-excluded package bid 
minus the cost of their non-monetary incentives.  
The benefits of CRAM are significant.  Under this method, bidders receive this 
highest possible value by “truthful revelation” of their preferences.  While other auctions 
or surveys encourage members to overstate their valuation of incentives, CRAM does 
not.  Under CRAM, individuals should bid what they are truly willing to give up for an 
NMI.  The risk of overbidding an incentive is that they might get stuck paying more for 
an incentive than it is actually worth to them.  If they underbid an incentive, they risk not 
being retained when they would like to be retained.  Neither scenario is supportive of 
being less than honest in their incentive valuations.  
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VI.  ADDRESSING VARIABLE VALUATIONS II:  PREFERENCE 
ELICITATION WITH INCENTIVE COMBINATIONS 
A. THE COMPLEXITY OF PREFERENCE ELICITATION WITH 
INCENTIVE COMBINATIONS 
In considering the CRAM methodology for determining personalized retention 
incentives for sailors, the structure of the auction process is extremely important if the 
results are to be considered valid.  As with any auction, to be valid, the auction itself must 
be easy to use and not overly burdensome or time consuming to participate.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, the “full information” variant of the CRAM, 
in which each bidder provides his valuation for each possible combination of non-
monetary incentives, fully compensates for all classes of variability in valuations 
identified in this thesis.  In particular, the full elicitation of valuations allows the CRAM 
to completely incorporate any variation between valuations of NMIs when offered alone 
vs. when offered as part of a combination of incentives. 
An important consideration that must be addressed in developing any mechanism 
that might be used to elicit NMI valuations is what this thesis identifies as incentives to 
the 2n problem.  For example, if the CRAM were indeed to elicit a valuation for every 
possible combination of incentives, each bidder would have to submit a minimum of 2n 
bids, where the superscript (n) is the number of incentives offered.    
In the case of the SWO study, the valuations of three particular incentives were 
explored in detail, therefore 23 combinations of these three incentives were possible, and 
a minimum of 8 questions must be asked. In this case, the survey addressed more than 
just those three incentives, however, and asked a total of 12 questions related to the 
valuation of incentives.   
The Enlisted Retention survey took a different approach to addressing the 
valuation elicitation problem.  This survey addressed 13 separate incentives, but only 
addressed two groups of three incentives in combination.  The resultant survey asked a 
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total of 25 questions related to valuation solicitation.  The author chose to forego results 
for every combination of incentive, choosing not to elicit valuations for several of the 
incentives combinations.  
The complexity of the 2n problem should be readily apparent.  If the Navy were to 
consider a program that offered 10 different non-monetary incentives, the minimum 
number of questions required to value all incentive combinations would be 1,024.  
Obviously this would be prohibitive from an implementation standpoint.  From a 
validation standpoint, it is intuitive to think that the results would not be trustworthy 
because the burden of completing such a questionnaire would force most individuals to 
just “give up” without answering all questions or providing conflicting answers.   
Additionally, such a process would require the respondent to keep track of or recall the 
valuations he/she placed on each incentive and make a conscious judgment on the 
valuation he offered for each individual and combination of incentives.   
B. THE (LIMITED) CONSEQUENCES OF ASSUMING ADDITIVE 
VALUATIONS 
This research has addressed many of the aspects associated with variability in 
preference for and valuation of NMIs as part of the CRAM.  Information requirements to 
the 2n as described above reflects the most troubling problem associated with attempting 
to elicit a valuation for each and every combination of incentives to consider as part of a 
combinatorial retention auction.   
One possible simplifying alternative to eliciting valuations for each and every 
combination of incentives would be to only elicit the valuation for each NMI individually 
and assume that the valuations offered by each respondent were additive in nature, if 
included as part of an incentive combination.  For example, the mechanism could ask for 
each sailor to submit a valuation for some non-monetary incentive A – denoted Value(A) 
– as well as a valuation for some other non-monetary incentive B – denoted Value(B) – 
but would simply assume that the valuation for these two incentives in combination was 
simply the sum of the “stand-alone” valuations.  In other words, the mechanism would 
assume Value(A+B) = Value(A) + Value(B). 
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From an implementation perspective, the advantage of making this assumption 
should be readily understood. For 10 non-monetary incentives, for example, each bidder 
would only need to submit 10 valuations as opposed 1,024 valuations as previously 
calculated. As with any policy, the greater the ease of implementation, assuming the 
value of the policy is adequate, the greater the likelihood of compliance and buy-in.  Of 
concern at this point is the question of what might be lost or given up if the valuation of 
preferences is assumed to be additive.   
Related to the CRAM, there are two potential concerns with assuming valuations 
are additive, however.  The first occurs when the respondents’ valuations are assumed to 
be additive, when in actuality there valuations are supra-additive – when Value(A+B) > 
Value(A) + Value(B) – and the retention outcome is altered as a consequence of this 
assumption. The second potential concern occurs when the respondent’s valuations are 
assumed to be additive when actually they are sub-additive – when Value(A+B) < 
Value(A) + Value(B) – and the retention outcome is again altered as a consequence of 
this assumption..  Each of these cases is addressed individually below. As will be 
demonstrated, the presence of super-additive or sub-additive preferences only influences 
the outcome of the CRAM in certain very particular scenarios.  
1. Implications of Assuming Additive Valuations, When Actual 
Valuations are Supra-Additive 
The first case of potential concern relates to potentially failing to retain a low cost 
bidder as a result of assuming additive valuations when the individual’s true valuation of 
a combination of NMIs is actually supra-additive (the NMIs are complementary or 
synergistic).  As you may recall, an individual’s retention cost in the CRAM is inversely 
related to the surplus that he or she has for a given incentive or combination of 
incentives.  The surplus reflects the individual’s value minus the cost of the incentive or 
combination.  If we assume that a bidder’s value for a given combination of incentives is 
additive when in actuality their valuation is supra-additive, we are in essence understating 
their surplus (and thus overstating their overall retention cost) when determining which 
bidders the CRAM will retain.  It is possible, therefore, that a sailor might not be retained 
by the mechanism when in fact he or she would be willing to retain at a cost less than the 
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“cutoff cost” (i.e., the total cost of the first-excluded package) associated with the set of 
retained sailors. This could potentially also increase the Navy’s retention costs. 
The first three scenarios in Table 6 below illustrate cases in which a bidder holds 
significant supra-additive value for the combination of incentives A and B, but we 
assume his value is only additive.  Recalling the methodology related to valuing retention 
packages, packages are ranked based upon surplus value.  Surplus value is determined by 
willingness to give up cash bonus minus the incentives’ costs to provide. With supra-
additive error, we are underestimating the actual surplus a bidder has for a combination 
of incentives.  In this case, the bidder could potentially not be retained by assuming 
additive values, when in fact the Navy would have been better off and the bidder would 
have gained value if he or she were retained.  
Scenarios 1 and 3 of Table 6 below are not problematic.  In these cases, based 
upon the assumption of additive valuation, those who wish to be retained are offered 
retention, and those who do not wish to be retained are not offered retention.  (The value 
to retain is above or below the cutoff cost, respectively).  Scenario 2 of Table 6 
demonstrates the potential of underestimating the actual surplus of the bidder for the 
given combinations.  In scenario 2, under an additive valuation assumption, the cost to 
retain is 36, when the bidder could actually be retained at 26.  In this case the assumed 
cost to retain is above the cutoff of 30 and retention is not offered when the bidder 
actually could have been (and would want) to be retained.   
2. Implications of Assuming Additive Valuations, when Actual 
Valuation is Sub-Additive 
The second class of scenarios of potential concern from assuming additive 
valuations of incentives is when the bidder actually holds a sub-additive valuation for a 
combination of NMIs (the NMIs are partial or complete substitutes for one another).  In 
contrast to the case of supra-additive valuations described above, in this case the bidder 
would be assumed to hold a larger surplus for the combination of incentives than is 
actually the case, and may potentially be offered retention based upon an incentive  
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package that is insufficient to motivate him or her to retain.  In this case, assuming the 
retention of such a sailor could cause the Navy to retain fewer sailors than expected and 
fall short of its retention goal.  
Scenarios four through nine in Table 6 below illustrate cases in which a bidder 
has sub-additive valuations for two non-monetary incentives (labeled A and B) and yet it 
is assumed that the valuations are additive. 
Scenarios 4, 6, 7, and 9 in Table 6 demonstrate instances in which no problem 
occurs from assuming additive valuation when actual valuation is sub-additive.  In each 
of these scenarios, retention is offered to those willing to retain and retention is not 
offered to those who are unwilling to retain.   
Scenario 5 demonstrates a situation in which the bidder is potentially willing to 
retain, but would require selling back either NMI A or NMI B to do so.  Since the NMI’s 
in the sub-additive “error” are substitutes, selling back to the Navy either of the NMIs 
would result in returning to the bidder some of their surplus that was lost under the 
additive assumption, and therefore push their cost to retain below the cutoff, and result in 
retaining the bidder, if he were allowed to sell back an NMI. 
Scenario 8 is the only truly problematic scenario from Table 6, if we assume 
additivity in the presence of actual sub-additivity.  In this situation, the assumed cost to 
retain is below the retention cost cut-off, and therefore the bidder is offered retention 
under the additive assumption.  Given that the individual has sub-additive valuation for 
NMIs A and B, his actual cost to retain is driven above the cut-off.  The result is that the 
bidder is offered retention, but the value of the package offered is not sufficient to entice 







Table 6.   Illustration of problem scenarios and non-problem scenarios when 
assuming additive valuations. 





















1 40 10 10 30 8 36 26 40 24 Yes Yes No
2 40 10 10 30 8 36 26 30 14 No Yes Yes - Retainable@ lower cost
3 40 10 10 30 8 36 26 20 4 No No No
4 40 10 10 17 8 36 39 44 28 Yes Yes No
5 40 10 10 17 8 36 39 38 22 Yes No No - Retainablewith 1 NMI
6 40 10 10 17 8 36 39 32 16 No No No
7 40 10 10 17 6 32 35 38 26 Yes Yes No
8 40 10 10 17 6 32 35 34 22 Yes No Yes - Can't retain at cutoff cost
9 40 10 10 17 6 32 35 30 18 No No No
 
 
C. THE FREQUENCY OF ERROR WHEN ASSUMING ADDITIVE 
VALUATIONS 
The previous section demonstrated how the presence of supra-additive or sub-
additive valuations could potentially complicate the implementation of the CRAM if 
additive valuations are assumed.  The question remains, however, as to how frequently 
such “errors” would occur in reality. 
How frequently do supra-additive valuations actually occur? How frequently are 
such supra-additive valuations innocuous, such as in scenarios 1 and 3 from Table 6 
above, and how frequently do they create the problem illustrated in scenario 2 above? 
Similarly, how frequently do sub-additive valuations actually occur? How frequently are 
such sub-additive valuations innocuous, such as in scenarios 4, 6, 7 and 9 from Table 6 
above, and how frequently do they create the problem illustrated in scenario 8 above? 
To address these questions, this research used a Monte Carlo simulation (using 
Crystal Ball simulation software) to model CRAM outcomes.  The simulation was run for 
the enlisted survey data, but only included those NMIs for which respondents provided 
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their values for individual and all possible combinations of incentives (homeport, 
geographic stability for two tours and compressed work week; homeport, lump sum SRB, 
and telecommuting).  The Monte Carlo simulation selected different NMI costs and we 
tracked two sets of CRAM results; assuming additive preferences and using the 
respondents’ actual preferences.  The range of error (instances in which the supra and 
sub-additive errors affected the final mix of sailors retained) was recorded based on 
10,000 trials for the simulation results.  The model was run for different retention levels 
(25%, 50%, and 75%) and the two different NMI cost distributions discussed above in the 
Enlisted Retention Study methodology (the all positive range of NMI values, VP(AP), 
and the upper half of the positive range for NMI values, VP(HP)).  For reference the NMI 
cost ranges in the enlisted survey is provided in Table 7 below. 






Homeport $1 $10,000 $50,000
Geographic Stability (2 tours) $7 $5,539 $50,000
Compressed Work Week $1 $5,000 $41,026
Telecommuting $13 $7,750 $70,000
Lump Sum SRB $3 $5,000 $90,000  
For reporting purposes, I have assumed, as did Zimmerman (2008), that the NMI 
costs are more accurately depicted using the higher of the NMI costs assumptions 
(VP(HP)); the lower half of the value distributions would appear to represent 
unrealistically low costs for most of the associated NMIs.  Further research is needed to 
more accurately estimate the NMI costs.  The simulation results presented here are the 
average for the different NMI combinations and retention levels examined under the 
“higher NMI cost” assumption.  
1. Supra-additive Error 
The incidence of supra-additive error, based on our 10,000 trials, averaged less 
than 1% and the cost implications were limited.  In these simulations, higher retention 
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and NMI cost levels decreased the margin of error.  Given that this type of error has a 
minimal impact for implementing CRAM, we will not further discuss these findings. 
2. Sub-additive Error 
As previously discussed, the rate of sub-additive error could potentially be a cause 
for alarm, as this is the type of error which could potentially cause personnel planners to 
undershoot retention efforts utilizing CRAM.   Fortunately, the rate of sub-additive error 
was less than 3% under the VP(HP) cost assumption using CRAM and this particular data 
set. 
For accuracy and completeness, Table 8 below summarizes the average sub-
additive error rates from each set of simulations conducted, both “low cost” and “high 
cost.”  Simulation outputs for all retention levels under high positive costs are included in 
Appendix A.    
Table 8.   Frequency of Sub-Additive Error in Simulations Assuming 
Additive Valuations  
VP(AP) Cost Simulations   VP(HP) Cost Simulations 
  Min Max Mean    Min Max Mean 
25 % Ret 3.3-4.6 24.5-25.7 12.9-16.3  25% Ret 0 6.6-7.3 1.9-2.48 
50% Ret 1.99-4.98 8.97-14.95 4.65-9.05  50% Ret 0 4-4.7 
0.78-
0.96 
75% Ret 0.66-1.77 4.87-5.75 2.6-3.8   75% Ret 0 2.4-3.98 
0.49-
1.03 
In Table 8 above the labels min, max, and mean represent the percentage of time 
that Crystal Ball simulation returned a value that resulted in sub-additive error, based on 
the two developed cost estimations.  As previously indicated, the higher cost estimation 
VP(HP) was the only result reported.  The maximum error rate returned from Crystal Ball 
simulation was 7.3%, and the average error rate returned was 2.48%. 
The results of this model indicate that less than 3% of the time there is difficulty 
associated with the making a sub-additive error, compared to the “full” model motivated 
by Zimmerman (2008).  Overall, implementation of this model based upon additive 
assumptions offers a tremendous advantage in implementation, with limited 
consequences.   
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D. CRAM VARIATION I:  BIDDER IDENTIFICATION OF SUPRA-
ADDITIVE OR SUB-ADDITIVE COMBINATIONS 
The previous section demonstrated that a simplified variation of the CRAM, in 
which bidders only submit valuations for NMIs on a “stand-alone” basis, could be 
implemented with very low frequency of error. Nonetheless, there are additional 
variations of the CRAM mechanism which further reduce (or even eliminate) such errors 
without requiring the complexity of the “full information” CRAM, in which bidder 
submit valuations for all possible combinations of NMIs. 
For example, the survey data referenced in this thesis indicates that, while sub-
additive and (to a lesser degree) supra-additive valuations do indeed exist, it is often the 
case that (1) the value of certain or even many NMI combinations do exhibit perfect 
additivity or approximate (“close enough”) additivity for some individuals, and/or (2) 
much or all of the sub- or supra-additivity in valuations is captured in combinations of 
two NMIs, limiting the value or necessity of inquiring about combinations of three or 
more NMIS. 
Hence, another variation of CRAM that could potentially further address sub- and 
supra-additive preferences would assume additive values as a default, but allow 
individual bidders to identify cases where they value combinations of incentives as either 
sub-additive or supra-additive.  This implementation could reduce the information 
requirements of additive valuations, while increasing accuracy within the model by 
allowing individuals to make it expressly clear which incentives are significant 
substitutes or complements. 
E. CRAM VARIATION II:  MENU OR CAFETERIA CRAM 
A particularly appealing variation of the CRAM is the so-called “menu” or 
“cafeteria” variation. The menu CRAM approach incorporates and compensates for sub- 
or supra-additive preferences 100% of the time, while also minimizing the bid 
submission burden placed on service-members. 
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The menu CRAM method provides the opportunity for service members to 
individually choose which incentives they desire from a given set of NMI offerings.  
Menu CRAM is implemented as follows: 
• Service members are provided a list or “menu” of available non-monetary 
incentives along with their associated costs 
• Service members identify which NMIs they value more than cost  
– Each NMI is selected with full information about the other NMIs chosen, 
so service members themselves must consider supra- or sub-additivity  
• Service members also submit a bid indicating the minimum cash bonus they 
would need to retain  
– The cash bid assumes that they would receive all NMIs chosen from menu 
if retained 
• The cost of each retention “package” is calculated and service members with 
lowest cost packages are retained 
– Cost = cash bid + cost of all NMIs chosen from the menu 
The menu CRAM fully incorporates the non-additive preferences of valuation of 
non-monetary incentives.  As identified above, the cost of each package is determined 
by identification of a cash bid plus the cost of any incentives the bidder chooses as part 
of the retention package.  Each bidder knows the cost of each incentive, and must 
therefore choose the combination of NMIs that maximizes value for the individual.  In 
this regard, the individual must make the determination of substitution or 
complementary affects among the NMIs chosen.   
Since the bidder has knowledge of NMI costs, and will receive all chosen NMIs 
if they are retained, the optimal strategy is to submit a cash bid that is equal to their 
minimum value for willingness to retain, minus the cost of the NMIs they have chosen.  
If their total package bid is equal to the minimum cost to retain the first excluded sailor, 
they will be retained.   
To more fully explore the subtle differences between menus CRAM and CRAM 
under limited information conditions, scenarios 2, 5, and 8 from Table 6 are addressed 
under menu CRAM conditions. 
Scenario 2:  The bidder values NMIs as supra-additive at 30, and therefore would 
require a cash bid of 10 (minimum package value to retain (40) – value of NMIs (30)).  
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The cost of the NMIs is 16, so the total package cost 26 (cash bid (10) + cost of NMIs 
(16)) which is below the cutoff of 30, and the bidder is retained.  In this case, the bidder 
explicitly indicated supra-additive valuation for the combination of incentive A and B.  
Scenario 5:  The bidder values NMIs as sub-additive at 17, and therefore would 
require a cash bid of 23 to reach his minimum package total to retain.  With a cash bid of 
23, the total cost is 39, which is above the cutoff of 38, and therefore the bidder would 
not be offered retention.   
In this scenario, if the bidder were to choose only one NMI at a value of 10, then 
the cash bid would be 30 and the total cost would be 38, and therefore the bidder would 
be offered retention.  Again, the bidder is required to address sub- and supra-additivity 
related to the NMIs. 
Scenario 8:  In scenario 8, again the bidder values NMIs sub-additively at 17, 
which results in cash bid of 23.  The total package cost is 35, above the cutoff of 34.  
The bidder is not offered retention.    
Under an assumption of additive valuations, the bidders in scenarios 2, 5, and 8 
were each offered retention (or not) in error.  Under the menu CRAM the responsibility 
for determination of sub- and supra-additivity of incentives was placed on the bidder and 
resulted in more accurate retention offerings.   
The drawback to the menu type CRAM is that it requires a reasonable ex- ante 
estimate of costs.  To complicate matters, NMI costs likely vary with the level of 
utilization.  As utilization increases, the marginal cost of providing many incentives 
increases. Proper insight to utilization, and therefore costs, is required to use a menu type 
CRAM.   
One approach to address demand uncertainty would be to conservatively state 
relatively high NMI costs when CRAM is first introduced; this would guard against 
unexpectedly high NMI demand.  As NMI demand data accumulates over time, the cost 
estimates could be refined to better represent the true NMI costs. 
F. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has explored the complexity of the valuation elicitation problem, 
including “perfect” information versus the more limited information necessary to use 
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CRAM to set retention incentive packages.  This chapter explored the two types of errors 
which we expect to occur as a result of assuming additive valuations:  (1) failing to retain 
sailors with supra-additive preferences who could be retained below the “cutoff” cost; 
and expecting to retain sailors with sub-additive preferences who ultimately do not want 
to be retained, given the combination of monetary and non-monetary incentives offered 
to them by the mechanism.  After 10,000 trials of a Monte Carlo simulation model, the 
available data has shown that assuming additive values for non-monetary incentives does 
not produce significant differences compared to a “full information” model.  
Finally, additional simplified CRAM variations which incorporate non-additive 
valuations were discussed.  The results discussed here show there are multiple 
approaches available to implement a combinatorial retention auction mechanism in a 
manner which is both practical and accurate.   
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has sought to advance previous research by evaluating information 
elicitation factors related to utilizing non-monetary incentives, particularly as part of a 
Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism.  Given the approach taken by this thesis, 
variability in individual preferences and valuation of non-monetary incentives was an 
underlying and pervasive theme.   
Related specifically to variability, this research concluded there are four ways in 
which variability relates to non-monetary incentives: 
• Variability Across Non-Monetary Incentives 
• Variability Across Populations 
• Variability Within a Given Population 
• Variability Within Individual Preferences Over Incentive Combinations 
These sources of variability, while potentially problematic, actually serve as the 
compelling aspect of use of non-monetary incentives.  Accommodating for this 
variability via an appropriate methodology is critical, but if an appropriate model is 
chosen, implementation is easily accomplished and the opportunity to provide 
individualized incentive packages is maintained.  
The model in this research assumed additive valuations of the incentives within 
the CRAM model.  The simulation results showed that assuming additive valuations did 
not significantly affect outcomes when compared to the “full information” model.  Due to 
the greater ease of implementation, a limited model which assumes additive valuation 
should be considered as an option for implementing the CRAM.   
Ultimately, variability in non-monetary incentive valuation is pervasive and 
important in consideration of NMI offerings.  While variability influences the potential to 




Non-monetary incentives should be further considered as a valuable retention 
tool, but:  
• Must be careful which NMIs are provided 
• Must be careful to whom NMIs are offered 
• Must be careful in how NMI programs are implemented 
The Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism is able to fully accommodate 
for variability in the valuation of non-monetary incentives.  Considerations to 
implementation via the CRAM include: 
• A “full information” approach requires eliciting data on 2n preferences, and 
therefore could be data intensive, depending on the number of incentives 
offered 
• Simpler variations of the CRAM (additive or menu-style) provide practical 
solutions to implementation with limited adverse consequences.  
• The additive valuation assumption with limited information will provide an  
adequate compromise 
The menu-style CRAM can accommodate all types of variability, but requires 
estimating ex ante cost.  NMI costs are a significant factor in this thesis that can have a 
tremendous impact on the benefits of NMIs.  Not only are costs largely unknown, they 
will likely vary with changes in retention level.  To fully and accurately predict the 
benefit of any of these models, an accurate estimation of costs should be developed. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Investigate further the supra or sub-additive nature of NMI valuations 
This research was motivated based on a limited sample size.  The combinatorial 
aspects, although significant, should be further explored, with particular attention 
to differences between “populations” within the Navy.   
2. Estimate cost of NMIs at various levels of provision or use 
The level of use of non-monetary incentives will likely have a significant impact 
of the costs associated with providing incentives.  Broad investigation of the “top 
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10” non-monetary incentives that sailors value will provide insight to the nature 
of incentive valuation, as well as which incentives should be included as part of a 
non-monetary incentive program. 
3. Conduct simulation experiments to test and refine menu CRAM approach 
Motivation of the CRAM with improved cost information will provide a better 
understanding of the potential costs savings the Navy might enjoy.  Further, this 
information will provide better prediction of the type of retention expectations 
that should be possible with the CRAM.  
4. Evaluate CRAM (menu or otherwise) via small "test market" implementation for 
some particular rating or cohort. 
A certain level of pain and resistance is expected from implementing the CRAM. 
Any new process or policy will likely be met with resistance and apprehension.  
The best opportunity to gain support and understanding of a non-monetary 
incentive program is with buy-in from sailors.  Vital lessons will be learned from 
early implementation efforts, and a small cohort size will minimize 
implementation problems.  
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APPENDIX  
A. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The following charts depict the incidence of sub-additive errors for 10,000 Monte 
Carlo simulation trials within the “additive” model assumed for this research.  The title of 
each slide designates the retention level (as a percentage), high (VP(HP)) cost basis, and 
combination of incentives represented by the chart.  For example, the first chart 
represents 25% retention rate, high cost estimate VP(HP), and incentive combination Add 
1 (homeport choice, Geographic stability 2 tours, and compressed work week).   The Add 
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